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THE INDIANA LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS EXEMPTION
STATUTE AND THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
Statutes exempting life insurance proceeds from creditors' actions'
embody the principle that "the support of wife and children as a positive
obligation in law as well as morals should be extended to protect them
from destitution after the debtor's death, by permitting him . . . to de-
vote a moderate portion of his earnings to keep on foot a security for sup-
port ... . "2 The competing principle that "persons must be just before
they are generous and . . . debts must be paid before gifts are made"3 is
embodied in fraudulent conveyance statutes.4
The exemption and fraudulent conveyance statutes conflict where an
insured has purchased or paid the premiums on a life insurance policy
while insolvent and where an insured has, while insolvent, transferred to
an exempt beneficiary the beneficial interest in a life insurance policy
originally payable to a non-exempt beneficiary. To resolve this conflict
and determine whether the insured has defrauded his creditors, a court
must decide two fundamental legal questions. The first is whether fraud
can be inferred from the purchase, payment of premiums, or transfer
during insolvency or must be proven by additional evidence of actual in-
tent to defraud. The second is what measure of recovery is permitted if
fraud is proven.5 Indiana has both fraudulent conveyance statutes6 and
1. The first exemption statute was the Verplanck Act, N.Y. Laws 1840, ch. 80,
which permitted a married woman to insure the life of her husband and obtain the pro-
ceeds free from the claims of her husband's creditors. Massachusetts followed New
York in 1844 with a statute that accorded similar privileges to beneficiaries other than
married women. Mass. Laws 1844, ch. 82. Tennessee continued the early experimenta-
tion in 1846 by combining exemption and distribution provisions. Tenn. Laws 1846, ch.
216. Ohio concluded the early phase of the statutory development in 1847 by exempting
life insurance proceeds effected 'by a husband for the benefit of his wife. Ohio Laws
1847, at 53. These early statutes became basic prototypes for other jurisdictions. To-
day all states, with the apparent exception of Utah, have similar exemption provisions,
the Indiana statute being enacted in 1925.
2. Central Nat'l Bank v. Hume, 128 U.S. 195, 211 (1888).
3. Freeman v. Pope, L.R. 5 Ch. 538, 540 (1870).
4. The first statute concerning fraudulent conveyances was 13 Eliz. c. 5 (1571).
Then life insurance was considered a chose in action and, therefore, not subject to the
reach of the statute. Dundas v. Dutens, 1 Ves. 196, 30 Eng. Rep. 298 (1790). It re-
mained for The Insolvent Debtor's Act to bring life insurance within the purview of the
law of fraudulent conveyances. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110 (1838). Today all states have en-
acted similar statutes, Indiana's being enacted in 1852.
5. In the premiums paid during insolvency problem possible recoveries are: the
amount of the premiums paid during insolvency, an aliquot share of the proceeds (that
proportion of the proceeds that the premiums paid in fraud of creditors is to the entire
amount of premiums expended for the policy), or the entire proceeds. When a transfer
is involved the recovery may be either the amount of the premiums paid during insol-
vency, the cash surrender value at the time of transfer, or the entire proceeds. Generally
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an exemption statute,' but no Indiana appellate court has considered the
relationship between them. The purpose of this note is to suggest how
the courts might interpret the statutes as they relate to each other and to
evaluate this interpretation.
The Indiana Position Before Adoption of the Exemption Statute
Prior to the enactment of the exemption statute in 1924, Indiana
courts afforded protection to the families of deceased debtors without the
aid of a life insurance proceeds exemption statute by permitting debtors
to maintain a reasonable amount of life insurance free from the claims of
their creditors.
It is clear that the doctrine of constructive fraud was not applied in
Indiana before adoption of the exemption statute. A fraudulent intent
was not inferred from the mere fact of the insolvency of the insured. The
earliest cases were Foster v. Brown8 and Pence v. Makepeace, both de-
cided by the Indiana Supreme Court in the May term of 1879. In Foster
the complaint averred that the insured had paid premiums while he was
insolvent. The court held that fraud in obtaining and maintaining the
policies during insolvency would not be presumed; since there were no
other facts that showed a fraudulent intent, the court dismissed the com-
plaint. In Pence the complaint alleged that the insured had paid premiums
these recoveries have been limited by the amount of the debt. But, under the construc-
tive trust theory, a few courts have given the creditors the entire proceeds irrespective
of their relation to the amount of the debt. See Fearn v. Ward, 80 Ala. 555, 2 So. 114(1886).
6. The applicable Indiana statutes follow:
"All conveyances or assignments, in writing or otherwise . . . of goods or things
in action . . . made or suffered with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors
. . . shall be void as to the persons sought to be defrauded." Ind. Rev. Stat. 1852, ch.
42, § 17, IND. ANN. STAT. § 33-403 (Burns 1949 Repl.).
"All deeds of gift, conveyances, transfers, or assignments, verbal or written, of
goods or things in action, made in trust for the use of the person making the same, shall
be void as against creditors, existing or subsequent, of such person." Ind. Rev. Stat.
1852, ch. 42, § 18, IND. ANN. STAT. § 33-409 (Burns 1949 Repl.).
"The question of fraudulent intent, in all cases arising under the provision of this
act, shall be deemed a question of fact. . . ." Ind Rev. Stat. 1852, ch. 42, § 21, IND.
ANN. STAT. 33-412 (Burns 1949 Repl.).
7. Ind. Acts 1935, ch. 162, § 155, IND. ANN. STAT. § 39-4210 (Burns 1965 Repl.).
The pertinent provisions follow:
All policies of life insurance upon the life of any person, which may hereafter
mature, and which have been or shall be taken out for the benefit of, or bona
fide assigned to the wife or children, or any relative dependent upon such per-
sons, or any creditor, shall be held, subject to change of beneficiary from time
to time, if desired, for the benefit of such wife or children, or other relative, or
creditor, free and clear from all claims of the creditors of such insured per-
son; and the proceeds or avails of all such life insurance shall be exempt from
all liabilities from any debt or debts of such insured person.
8. 65 Ind. 234 (1879).
9. 65 Ind. 345 (1879).
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on a policy while insolvent and that, therefore, the beneficiary held the
policy as a quasi trustee for the benefit of creditors. The court avoided
deciding this issue, but it indicated that the creditor's position was not
well taken.'" The court said that when a life insurance policy has been
taken out by a husband and father on his own life for the apparent pur-
pose of providing for the comfort and support of his family after his
death, clear and convincing proof of fraudulent intent would be necessary
to divert the insurance from its intended purpose."'
The doctrine of constructive fraud has also been rejected in cases in-
volving a transfer during insolvency of rights from non-exempt to ex-
empt beneficiaries. In Johnson v. Alexander2 the insured had assigned
a policy payable to his personal representative to certain creditors in re-
turn for their agreement to pay the premiums on the policy and, upon the
insured's death, to pay the proceeds in excess of their claims to the heirs
of the insured. After the insured's death, the assignee-creditors paid the
balance of the proceeds to the heirs. An unsecured creditor contended
the excess proceeds were payable to the insured's estate on the ground that
the assignment was a gift to the heirs during insolvency and therefore a
fraudulent conveyance. The court rejected this contention and held that
actual intent must be proven. The same result was reached in State ex rel
Wright v. Tomlinson,3 where the insured, while insolvent, assigned to
his wife a policy originally payable to his estate. The court held that
mere evidence of an assignment while insolvent is not sufficient to estab-
lish a fraudulent intent.
The Indiana courts' rejection of the constructive fraud doctrine
found support in the United States Supreme Court's decision in Central
Nat'l Bank v. Hume.4 The court said that a man should be entitled to
devote a moderate portion of his earnings to the support of his family, at
least to the extent of requiring that the fraudulent intent be clearly
shown. In determining intent, both the Indiana court and he United
States Supreme Court looked to the reasonableness of the amount of pre-
miums paid by the insured. In all of these cases the courts found that the
amount of premiums was reasonable, but in none of them did the courts
indicate what an unreasonable amount might be.
Since fraudulent intent was not established in any of the Indiana
10. The insolvency issue was not tried in the court below nor presented in the record
on appeal. The Indiana Supreme Court instead based its decision for the beneficiary
on the failure of the creditor to prove that the beneficiary had assigned the policy to him.
11. Pence v. Makepeace, 65 Ind. 345, 359 (1879).
12. 125 Ind. 575 (1890).
13. 16 Ind. App. 662 (1896).
14. 128 U.S. 195 (1888).
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cases, the courts' expressions on the permissible quantum of recovery
where fraud is established are dicta. In both the "transfer" cases and the
"premiums paid during insolvency" cases the courts emphatically ex-
pressed their opinion that if intent were proven, the creditors' recovery
should be limited to the sum of the premiums paid by the insured during
his insolvency. 5 In Pence the Indiana Supreme Court was uncertain
whether recovery should be allowed even on a clear showing of fraudu-
lent intent, but suggested that if recovery were permitted, it should be
limited to the sum of the premiums paid during insolvency."8 In the
transfer cases, Johnson and Tomlinson, the courts were more certain that
recovery should be permitted if intent were proven, but also indicated
that recovery should be limited to the sum of the premiums paid during
insolvency. 7
The Probable Indiana Position After
thw Adoption of the Exemption Statute
It is probable that the present Indiana position is: where there is a
premium payment or purchase by an insolvent, there can be no recovery
by a creditor so long as the policy designates an exempt beneficiary; and
where there is a transfer by an insolvent from a non-exempt to an exempt
beneficiary there must be proof of actual intent to defraud, and the re-
covery is limited to the amount of the premiums paid during insolvency.
When an Indiana court finds it necessary to resolve the conflict be-
tween the state's fraudulent conveyance statutes and its exemption stat-
ute, it can find guidance in the experience of those states that have similar
exemption statutes. There are twenty states including Indiana with
statutes that do not expressly speak of fraud. 8 These statutes may be
classified as to whether they exempt as a beneficiary the insured, his
estate, or his personal representative. The transfer problem cannot arise
in those states where the insured, his estate, and his personal representa-
tive are exempt, since the transfer would be from one exempt beneficiary
15. When a recovery is limited to the sum of the premiums paid during insolvency,
interest is computed thereon and added to the sum of the premiums.
16. Pence v. Makepeace, 65 Ind. 345, 360 (1879).
17. Johnson v. Alexander, 125 Ind. 575, 579 (1890) ; State ex rel. Wright v. Tom-
linson, 16 Ind. App. 662, 678 (1896).
18. See CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 690.19; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 77-2-2(m) (1963);
FLA. STAT. § 222.13 (1961) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 11-205(9) (1947) ; IowA CODE ANN. §
511.37 (1949) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 40-414 (1963) ; LA. REV. STAT. § 22:647 (1958) ;
MISS. CODE ANN. § 308 (1942) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 376.560 (1949) ; MONT. REv. CODES
ANN. § 93-5814(7) (1947) ; NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-371 (1960) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-5-3
(1953) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-10-18 (1959); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 517 (1954); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 37-169 (1962); S.D. CODE § 31.1509 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-1108
(1955) ; TEx. INs. CODE art. 21.22 (1963); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3705 (1958).
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to another. There are six states besides Indiana 9 that do not exempt
these beneficiaries.2" An examination of the case law of these six states
suggests that the probable Indiana position will be that stated above.2'
The exemption statute that is most similar to Indiana's is the Penn-
sylvania statute,2" which was enacted in 1923, two years after Pennsyl-
vania's adoption of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act.22 The
premiums paid during insolvency problem has long been distinguished
from the transfer problem in Pennsylvania.2" Irving Bank v. Alexander
represents the present Pennsylvania position concerning the payment of
premiums during insolvency.25 The court not only refused to permit the
creditor to reach the proceeds of policies amounting to $500,000, but also
denied his right to recover the amount of the premiums paid during in-
solvency. The court reasoned that creditors were without a remedy since
a provision of Pennsylvania's 1911 exemption statute26 that permitted a
creditor to reach premiums paid by an insured with intent to defraud
creditors was omitted from subsequent exemption acts.2 Although suf-
ficient facts were not averred in the complaint to raise the issue of actual
intent, a federal district court later held that the statute granted an ab-
19. The Indiana statute exempts the wife, children, dependent relative, and creditor
of the insured. See note 7 supra.
20. Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Vermont are
the six states.
21. No applicable case law on the problems under consideration was found for in-
terpretation of the Vermont and South Carolina statutes.
22. The Pennsylvania exemption statute states: "The net amount payable under
any policy of life insurance or under any annuity contract upon the life of any person
heretofore or hereafter made for the benefit of or assigned to the wife or children or
dependent relative of such person, shall be exempt from all claims of the creditors of
such person arising out of or based upon any obligation created after the passage of this
act, whether or not the right to change the named beneficiary is reserved by or per-
mitted to such person." PA. STAT. ANN. tit 40, § 517 (1954).
A comparison with the Indiana statute (see note 7 supra) reveals the following dif-
ferences: Pennsylvania exempts annuity contracts and Indiana does not; Indiana ex-
empts designated creditors and Pennsylvania does not; and Indiana exempts "bona fide"
assignments while Pennsylvania omits "bona fide." For purposes of analogy these dif-
ferences are not of sufficient import to detract from any conclusions that may be
drawn.
23. PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 39, §§ 351-63 (1954). The Uniform Fraudulent Convey-
ance Act is presently the law in twenty jurisdictions but not in Indiana. The primary
distinction between the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act and other fraudulent con-
veyance statutes as typified by the Indiana statute is that under the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act constructive fraud is sufficient to establish the requisite intent, i.e., the
mere fact of a purchase or premium payment, or transfer while insolvent establishes
the prima facie case.
24. See, e.g., Appeal of Elliot's Ex'rs, 50 Pa. 75 (1865).
25. 280 Pa. 466, 124 At. 634 (1924). The same position had been taken as early
as 1881 in McCutcheon's Appeal, 99 Pa. 133 (1881).
26. Laws of Pa. 1911, 581, 595 (§ 27).
27. Laws of Pa. 1915, No. 145; Laws of Pa. 1919, No. 128; Laws of Pa. 1923,
No. 335.
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solute exemption even if actual intent to defraud were proven." Thus
the present Pennsylvania position is that when the alleged fraud consists
of the payment of premiums during insolvency, the exemption statute
takes precedence over the fraudulent conveyance statute and creditors are
precluded from any recovery.
The Missouri courts have reached a contrary result, permitting re-
covery where fraud is present. However, this result is attributable to
the nature of the Missouri exemption statute, which designates a limit of
$500 per year that may be expended on premiums for insurance beyond
the reach of creditors. 9 The Missouri courts have held that if the de-
cedent debtor's premiums were below the statutory limit there can be no
consideration of fraud; but if more than $500 is expended in one year,
there is a presumption of fraudulent intent and the creditors may reach
all premiums expended over that amount."0 By designating a single cri-
terion, payment of premiums above $500, for the determination of fraud,
the legislature has implied that fraudulent conveyance concepts are to be
retained in the operation of the exemption statute.
The Ohio statute, although it expressly mentions fraud, might be
considered in interpreting the Indiana exemption statute. Authorities
have indicated that the Indiana exemption statute was taken from a 1913
Ohio act."' The Indiana exemption statute is a verbatim reproduction of
the first two sections of the 1913 Ohio act; but the Ohio statute includes
a third section, omitted from the Indiana statute, which enables creditors
to reach premiums fraudulently paid." The Indiana General Assembly's
omission of the third section of the Ohio act implies that a complete ex-
emption is intended when the alleged fraud consists of a payment of
premiums during insolvency. If the Indiana General Assembly had de-
sired to retain fraudulent conveyance concepts in this situation, it would
have copied the third section of the Ohio act.
Thus, the position that the Pennsylvania courts have taken on that
28. In re Silansky, 21 F. Supp. 41, 42 (E.D. Pa. 1937) : "the purpose of the Penn-
sylvania Act which grants an absolute exemption of amounts payable under life insur-
ance policies, regardless of whether the payments . . . were made with intent to defraud
creditors."
29. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 376.560 (1949).
30. Pullis v. Robison, 73 Mo. 201 (1880) ; Sternberg v. Levy, 159 Mo. 617, 60 S.W.
1114 (1901); Kiely v. Hickcox, 70 Mo. App. 617 (1897).
31. Ohio Laws 1913, at 558. The position that the Indiana exemption statute is a
duplicate of Ohio's was taken by the Seventh Circuit in In re Fogel, 164 F.2d 214 (7th
Cir. 1947), and by Riesenfeld, Life Insuraiwe and Creditors' Remedies in the United
States, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 583 (1957).
32. The Ohio courts have held that a recovery is permitted when fraud is proven
and that fraud means constructive fraud. Child v. Graham, 8 Ohio Dec. Reprint 294
(1882) (also printed in 7 WEEmuY CiNciNNATI LAw BuLL. 43); John Weenink & Sons
v. Blahd, 73 Ohio App. 67, 54 N.E.2d 426 (1943).
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state's exemption statute and the omission in the Indiana exemption
statute of an express remedy for a defrauded creditor point to a complete
exemption in the premiums paid during insolvency problem. The Indiana
position before adoption of the exemption statute was at most one step
removed. The dicta in Pence was equivocal, suggesting that if fraud
were proven a recovery of the sum of the premiums paid during insol-
vency was permissible, but also suggesting that the court was unsure that
any recovery was possible. By adopting an exemption statute the General
Assembly may have intended to remove this ambiguity and to place
debtors in a better position than they were before the statute was adopted.
The Indiana exemption statute's omission of any reference to fraud
does not compel the courts to construe the statute as granting a complete
exemption when there is a transfer during insolvency. An indication of
the probable Indiana position on the transfer problem can also be found
in the experience of states with similar exemption statutes.
The Kansas courts have not decided the transfer problem, but the
Kansas Supreme Court's construction of the purpose of the exemption
statute indicates that the statute does not grant a complete exemption.
In Exchange State Bank v. Poindexter the court said: "the exemption of
insurance money to the beneficiary is no more sacred in this state than
the exemption of the homestead, and where the element of fraud enters
into the transaction by which the homestead is acquired, the exemption
fails.""3
In the transfer problem, unlike the premiums paid during insolvency
problem, a statutory limit on premiums does not preclude consideration
of fraud. Nebraska, like Missouri, has such a limit."4 In Laborde v.
Farmer's State Bank 5 an insolvent insured had changed the beneficiary
from his estate to his wife two days before his death. The wife con-
tended that she was entitled to that share of the proceeds that the $500
statutory limit would purchase, but the Nebraska court held that she was
entitled to none of the proceeds, reasoning that the change of beneficiary
was an attempt to exempt a part of the proceeds which otherwise could
have been reached by creditors. The court said that the transfer was
presumptively fraudulent and that the burden of proof was upon the bene-
ficiary to establish the validity of the transaction, even though the Ne-
braska fraudulent conveyance act requires proof of actual intent.3 6 In
contrast the Missouri court held in a similar case that the transfer was
33. 137 Kan. 101, 105, 19 P.2d 705, 707 (1933).
34. NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-371 (1960).
35. 116 Neb. 33, 215 N.W. 559 (1927).
36. This corresponds to Ind. Rev. Stat. 1852, ch. 42 § 21, IND. ANN. STAT. § 33-412
(Burns 1956 Repl.), quoted in note 6 mtpra.
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valid," but permitted the creditors to reach the amount of the premiums
expended in excess of $500.
The Pennsylvania courts considered the transfer problem in Fidelity
Trust Co. v. Union Natl Bank"s where the insured had purchased
$250,000 of life insurance naming his estate as the beneficiary and while
insolvent had changed the beneficiary to a trustee for the benefit of his
wife and children. The court found sufficient facts to support the trial
court's finding of fraudulent intent; however, the court said that, even
disregarding evidence of actual fraudulent intent, the insolvency of the
insured rendered the transaction constructively fraudulent under the Uni-
form Fraudulent Conveyance Act in force in Pennsylvania. The credi-
tors were allowed to reach the entire proceeds of the policies fraudulently
conveyed,"9 perhaps because the wife and children were already adequately
provided for by another insurance trust of $500,000.
The 1933 decision in Fidelity Trust was consistent with the earlier
Pennsylvania decisions in Appeal of Elliot's Ex'rs and McKo'wn's
Estate,"' both decided before enactment of the 1911 exemption statute
2
granting a remedy to defrauded creditors.43 As noted earlier, this remedy
was omitted from later exemption statutes beginning in 1915," a fact
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court gave as a reason for its 1924 deci-
sion in the Irving Bank case that when the alleged fraud consisted of a
payment of premiums during insolvency, the creditor is without a rem-
edy.4 But it appears significant that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in Fidelity Trust did not reach the same conclusion when a transfer dur-
ing insolvency was involved, even though the court could have followed
the reasoning in Irving Bank and concluded that the remedy for defrauded
creditors had also been abandoned in the transfer cases."' Thus Penn-
37. Judson v. Walker, 155 Mo. 166, 55 S.XV. 1083 (1900).
38. 313 Pa. 467, 169 Atl. 209 (1933).
39. Creditors were denied recovery in two similar cases that were decided one year
later. However, these decisions are better based on reasons that involve the peculiar cir-
cumstances of the cases rather than a strict analysis of the relationship between the ex-
emption and fraudulent conveyance statutes. See Stutzman v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 315 Pa. 47, 172 Atl. 302 (1934), where the wife had joined previously with the in-
sured in an assignment of a policy payable to her and Potter Title & Trust Co. v. Fi-
delity Trust Co., 316 Pa. 316, 175 At. 400 (1934), where the insured originally had
policies payable to his wife and children and thereafter executed an insurance trust for
the benefit of them, a transfer that did not involve non-exempt beneficiaries.
40. 50 Pa. 75 (1865).
41. 198 Pa. 96, 47 Atl. 1111 (1901).
42. Laws of Pa. 1911, 581, 595 (§ 27).
43. Prior to 1911 the Pennsylvania exemption statute omitted mention of fraud.
See, e.g., Laws of Pa. 1868, No. 64.
44. Laws of Pa. 1915, No. 145. Succeeding exemption statutes continued to omit
the mention of fraud.
45. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
46. Fidelity Trust v. Union Nat'l Bank, 313 Pa. 467, 169 Atl. 209 (1933).
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sylvania has always afforded a remedy when the fraud consists of a trans-
fer during insolvency, and the presence or absence of express statutory
language pertaining to fraud is of no significance.
It is consistent that a recovery is permitted in the transfer problem
and denied in the premiums paid during insolvency problem. The specie
of fraud involved in the transfer problem is more acute. The creditor
may have been influenced by the availability of insurance proceeds where,
at the time the debt was created, the policy was payable to the insured, his
estate, or his personal representative." In addition the fraud involved is
more blatant when the approach of financial difficulty is accompanied by
a sudden transfer of assets that previously could be reached by creditors.
If the insured had as his primary purpose the protection of his family, he
would originally have had the policy made payable to them.
The Indiana exemption statute expressly exempts "bona fide assign-
ments."4 8 This indicates that at least fraudulent transfers by assignment
are not exempt, and, if logically extended, it may indicate that a fraudu-
lent change of beneficiary is not exempt. There is little practical differ-
ence between an assignment and a change of beneficiary. Although an
assignment is a transfer of complete ownership and a change of benefi-
ciary is not, the family relationship is such that the husband retains ef-
fective control of the policy in either event. At any time after assign-
ment, the wife could reassign the policy to the husband, thus equalizing
the practical consequences of the two methods of transfer.
Thus, if the Indiana exemption statute does not grant a complete
exemption in the transfer during insolvency situation, issues of intent
and quantum of recovery will arise. The Indiana courts will require
proof of actual intent. The constructive fraud doctrine has never ob-
tained in Indiana and by statute actual intent is required.4 9 States like
Pennsylvania that have indicated that constructive fraud may be suffi-
cient are states that have enacted the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act, which requires only constructive fraud.
The recovery will be limited to the sum of the premiums paid dur-
ing insolvency. Pennsylvania permits the creditor to reach the entire
proceeds, a better result since the creditor is rarely made whole by a re-
covery limited to premiums paid during insolvency. However, the Indi-
ana courts have indicated by dicta in Johnson and Tomlinson that the re-
47. The reliance factor is probably small in these situations, at least in transactions
involving professionals; however, it seems probable that reliance is present in a few
situations, particularly those involving the non-professional creditor.
48. See note 7 supra.
49. Ind. Rev. Stat. 1852, ch. 42 § 21, Iln. ANN. STAT. § 33-412 (Burns 1949 Repl.),
quoted in note 6 supra.
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covery must be limited to the amount of the premiums paid during insol-
vency, and it would be extremely difficult to imply that the legislature
intended to enhance creditors' rights by the adoption of an exemption
statute.
The Effect of the Indiana Position in Bankruptcy Proceedings
The problem of fraudulent conveyances of life insurance also arises
in bankruptcy. Section 70a(5) of the Federal Bankruptcy Act provides
that the life insurance policy of a bankrupt passes to the trustee unless
the bankrupt pays to the trustee an amount equal to the existing cash
surrender value of the policy."0 Should the bankrupt fail to save the
policy in the manner proscribed, the trustee under powers granted in sec-
tion 70a(3) may exercise the cash surrender option of the policy."' The
importance of sections 70a(3) and 70a(5) has been qualified by section
6 which, in effect, provides that the trustee can reach the cash surrender
value only if the state exemption law so permits."2
Indiana exempts the "proceeds or avails" of life insurance policies.53
Since "proceeds or avails" includes the cash surrender value, the Indiana
exemption statute does not permit the trustee to exercise the cash sur-
render option.5" Although the cash surrender value is exempt, the trus-
tee might attempt to recover when a fraudulent conveyance can be estab-
lished. The recovery would be limited to the sum of the premiums paid
in fraud of creditors where there was a transfer during insolvency, as it
would be in an Indiana court proceeding under the fraudulent conveyance
statutes. However, since the cash surrender value is exempt, a judgment
can only be satisfied from the proceeds of a matured policy; therefore
no collection is possible prior to the death of the insured.55 To ensure
collection after maturity a lien could be impressed on the policy under
section 70e of the Federal Bankruptcy Act."
50. Bankruptcy Act § 70a(5), 30 Stat. 565 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § l10a(5) (1964).
51. Bankruptcy Act § 70a(3), 30 Stat. 565 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § lOa(3) (1964).
52. Bankruptcy Act § 6, 30 Stat. 548 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1964).
53. See note 7 supra.
54. In the Matter of Summers, 253 F. Supp. 113 (N.D. Ind. 1966). The trustee
also unsuccessfully argued that the cash surrender value was not exempt because the
policy had not matured. He contended that a policy is matured and thus exempt only
when the insured has died or irrevocably designated an exempt beneficiary. The court
countered by stating that the clear intent of the statute was to protect the family of the
bankrupt while he was alive as well as after death and express language of the statute
granted the exemption even though the insured had retained the right to change the
beneficiary.
55. Doethlaff v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 117 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1941) ; Greiman
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 96 F.2d 823 (3d Cir. 1938) (N.J.).
56. Bankruptcy Act § 70e, 30 Stat. 565 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 110e (1964). This
remedy was suggested by Professor Riesenfeld. Riesenfeld, ,rupra note 31, at 616.
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Policy Considerations and Alternatives
The probable Indiana positions give preference to the principle of
family protection over that of just payment of debts. However, there
may be alternative positions that equitably balance both principles.
One alternative is the Indiana position before adoption of the ex-
emption statute: permitting creditors to recover all above a reasonable
amount in both the transfer and premiums paid during insolvency situa-
tions. This requires that the court determine what is reasonable accord-
ing to the circumstances of the case, a task that some feel the court is
uniquely suited to perform. Factors that a court might consider in mak-
ing this determination are: the age of the widow and children, the num-
ber of children, the ability of these survivors to find gainful employment,
the amount of the deceased's income, and the amount previously ex-
pended by the deceased to support his family. In effect a reasonable
amount has become that amount that is sufficient to support the family
according to the station in life which they enjoyed before deceased's
death.
The alternative most favorable to debtors is a complete exemption in
both the premiums paid during insolvency and the insolvent transfer
situations. The courts would disregard issues of fraud and direct the
entire proceeds of the policies to those exempt beneficiaries named in
the policy. This alternative places supreme importance on family pro-
tection and does so to the exclusion of all other policy considerations.
The probable Indiana positions and the two alternatives thus far
examined produce similar results. They place primary emphasis on the
well-being of the family at the expense of the creditor. Implicit in these
positions is a social argument that it is better for creditors to bear or at
least share the burden of family security rather than for the family to
become paupers or wards of the state. But the courts and legislatures
have developed inappropriate standards to protect the family. Instead
of exempting the amount that the survivors need to evade poverty and
maintain a comfortable life, the courts have limited the creditor's re-
covery, if any, to amounts paid or transferred in fraud of creditors. Very
often the creditors recover considerably less than the full amount of the
debt (or nothing under the probable Indiana position when the fraud
consists of payments of premiums during insolvency) even though the
remaining insurance proceeds are far in excess of what would be required
to adequately provide for the family. This seems unfair. There is good
reason to provide adequate support for the family, but little reason to ex-
empt more than is adequate for support.
The nature of today's life insurance policies indicates that creditor
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protection should be given greater consideration." The exemption stat-
utes originated before cash surrender, loan, and change of beneficiary
options became a part of the ordinary life insurance contract. If family
protection is to be assigned such great importance, it should be observed
that exercising the cash surrender, loan, and change of beneficiary op-
tions can destroy family protection no less than permitting creditors to
reach the policies. More significantly, these options present an oppor-
tunity for a debtor to screen his assets from his creditors." A Pennsyl-
vania court held that an insured's repayment of a loan on a life insurance
policy two weeks prior to bankruptcy is not in fraud of creditors." The
court reasoned that the exemption statute granted an absolute exemption
regardless of whether the bankrupt had a fraudulent intent. The sum
involved was only $1,000. If the court were to be consistent it would
have to grant a complete exemption however large the amount paid in
fraud of creditors might be. This result is unfortunate. A person who
foresees insolvency may gather whatever non-exempt assets he can reach
and purchase a single premium paid-up life insurance policy naming his
wife as the beneficiary. Upon the termination of his financial duress,
via a discharge in bankruptcy, he may convert the policy into cash by ex-
ercising the cash surrender option of the policy. Such conduct would
seem clearly fraudulent, yet in Pennsylvania, Indiana, and those states
exempting the cash surrender value the above transaction would not be
a fraudulent conveyance.
If creditor protection is to be favored, the appropriate alternative
would be strict adherence to fraudulent conveyance concepts developed
and still applied in other areas of the law. Life insurance would be
treated no differently from any other asset. There is nothing in those
statutes that do not mention fraud or exempt the insured, his estate, or
his personal representative to indicate that an exception to the law of
fraudulent conveyances is intended. At one time an Ohio court made
such an interpretation."0  However desirable that interpretation might be,
if has little chance of acceptance; life insurance has become one of the
most privileged assets in the United States."'
One alternative serves the legitimate purpose of family protection
and at the same time protects creditors. This alternative is a statute that:
57. See generally Cohen, The Fraudident Transfer of Life Insurance Policies, 88
U. PA. L. REv. 771 (1940); 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 6.03 (14th ed. 1940); 1 GLEN,
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCEs 317 (rev. ed. 1940).
58. MAcLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY § 161 (1956).
59. it re Silansky, 21 F. Supp. 41 (E.D. Pa. 1937).
60. Child v. Graham, 8 Ohio Dec. Reprint 294 (1882) (also printed in 7 VEEKLY
CINN. LAW BULL. 43).
61. Riesenfeld, supra note 31, at 617.
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(1) limits either the amount of premiums that may be expended per
year or the amount of proceeds that are exempt,62 (2) enlarges the ex-
empt beneficiary category to include the insured, his estate, and his per-
sonal representative, and (3) provides that the expenditure of any
amount above the statutory limit by an insolvent insured is constructively
fraudulent, entitling those injured to reach the proceeds, or that propor-
tion of the proceeds attributable to premiums in excess of the designated
premium limit. This alternative permits recovery in both the premiums
paid during insolvency and fraudulent transfer situations when the statu-
tory limit is exceeded.
In effect, the statutory limit designates a reasonable amount of life
insurance that may not be reached by creditors, and when combined with
the enlarged beneficiary category precludes any question of a fraudulent
conveyance below the statutory limit. Debtors as well as creditors bene-
fit from this alternative, since the family is assured of receiving all the
proceeds up to the statutory limit. Under the present Indiana position
when there is a fraudulent transfer the defrauded creditor can reach the
premiums paid during insolvency. If the fraud has continued for an
extended period, the proceeds available to the family upon the death of
the insured can be reduced from an adequate level to one below a mini-
mum subsistence. This would be especially true when the face value of
the policy was barely adequate initially. With a statutory limit these
marginal families are more fully protected.
The principal objection to a statutory monetary limit is that it
quickly becomes outdated because the purchasing value of the dollar is
constantly decreasing. This result can be mitigated by the insertion in
the statute of a cost of living factor or similar economic indicator that
would adequately relate the value of the dollar in any future period to the
value of the dollar when the statute was enacted. " The product of the
designated statutory limitation and the economic indicator would equal
the amount of the exemption in any subsequent period.
This suggested alternative would relieve the creditor of the burden
of proving actual fraudulent intent. The proof of actual intent is very
62. A $500 statutory limit on premiums has been adopted in three states: CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 690.19; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 376.560 (1949) ; MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 93-
5814(7) (1947). Five states have adopted a limit on the amount of the proceeds that
are exempt: CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 77-2-2(m) (1963) ($5000 limit) ; IOWA CODE
ANN. § 511.37 (1949) ($15,000 limit) ; MISS. CODE ANN. § 308 (1942) ($10,000 limit) ;
S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-169 (1962) ($25,000 limit) ; S.D. CODE § 31.1509 (1939) ($5,000
limit).
63. There are various indices which may be appropriate: among them are the
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics Index of average for the year wholesale prices
and its Consumer Price Index.
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difficult which, perhaps, explains why Indiana has had no recent litiga-
tion in this area."4  How does one prove actual intent? One writer sug-
gests that there are two methods: either by an admission of the insured
or by a substantial accumulation of circumstantial evidence from which
such intent may be inferred. 5 It seems very unlikely that an insured
would openly admit that his design was to place his assets beyond the
reach of creditors. By substituting a presumption of constructive fraud
for proof of actual fraudulent intent where the deceased purchases, pays
the premiums on, or transfers life insurance during insolvency, the statu-
tory limit reduces the amount of circumstantial evidence needed to prove
intent to a single event and thus makes it easier for creditors to recover.
Although the Indiana fraudulent conveyance statute requires proof in
fact of actual intent, an express intent requirement in the suggested ex-
emption statute would take preference over it.
CONCLUSION
The Indiana Life Insurance Proceeds Exemption Statute denies a
creditor any recovery when the alleged fraud consists of a payment of
premiums during insolvency and permits a recovery only of premiums
paid during insolvency when there is a fraudulent transfer. This statute
thus emphasizes family protection to the virtual exclusion of other policy
considerations. By ignoring these other considerations the exemption
statute has created opportunities for abuse. After adequate family pro-
tection has been provided, it is very difficult to justify the payment of
policy proceeds in excess of the adequate protection level to the family
when the deceased is a debtor, but it is impossible to justify when the de-
ceased has acted in fraud of his creditors. A new statute is needed to
prevent such abuse.
64. Another reason is the limited recovery, there being little motivation to reach
the premiums paid during insolvency when that amount is small.
65. Cohen, supra note 57, at 804.
